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Abstract
Gravity equations explaining foreign affiliates’ sales are ad hoc and hence, es-
timated coefficients are hard to interpret. We therefore provide the theoretical
underpinnings of the gravity equation applied to the analysis of sales of for-
eign affiliates of multinational firms. We argue that the success of the gravity
equation results from the fact that it can be derived from various theoretical
models. We illustrate this point by deriving a gravity equation from three
different models of multinational firms. Using data on real affiliate sales, we
show how this derived gravity equation can nevertheless be used to discrimi-
nate between the different theoretical models.
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1 Introduction
The gravity equation is one of the most often applied empirical techniques
to analyze bilateral trade. Yet, it is only recently that it has been applied
to the empirical analysis of sales of foreign affiliates of multinational firms
(Brainard, 1997; Braconier et al., 2002; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004). Indeed,
it provides a good fit in explaining the variation of the volume of affiliates’
sales. The empirical literature using the gravity equation finds that home and
host country’s market size have a positive effect on the volume of affiliate sales
while distance between the two countries has a negative effect on it.
However, according to the theory of multinational firms, distance raises the
costs of exporting and influences positively the decision to set-up affiliates in
foreign countries. Thus, there are a priori no raisons, why distance should
affect negatively the volume of their sales. We adjust two models of the hori-
zontal multinational firm to generate this negative relationship of affiliate sales
and distance.
So far, the relationship between the theory of multinational firms and the em-
pirical findings from the gravity equation is weak. Gravity equations explaining
foreign affiliates’ sales are ad hoc and hence, estimated coefficients are hard
to interpret. We provide the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity equation
applied to the analysis of sales of foreign affiliates. We show which implicit
assumptions are applied by trade empiricists that use this equation. We shed
lights on the theoretical mechanisms through which distance and market size
of home and host countries influence the volume of affiliate’s sales. To the best
of our knowledge a theoretical foundation of the gravity equation has not been
examined in the context of multinational firms’ activities.
We believe that just as for international trade, the success of the gravity equa-
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tion explaining affiliate sales results from the fact, that it can be derived from
different theoretical models. In this paper, we present three theoretical models
which differ significantly in their structure. We derive a gravity equation from
each of them. The resulting gravity equations look similar but they imply
different restrictions on the econometric model. The first two models explain
the emergence of horizontal multinational firms. Both apply the proximity
concentration framework. The first model assumes symmetric firms whereas
the second one incorporates firm heterogeneity. The third model explain the
emergence of vertical multinational firms using a factor proportion approach.
We start with a model of monopolistic competition and symmetric firms. This
model is close to the seminal paper of Brainard (1997), but it incorporates
intermediate inputs. We assume that part of these intermediates are imported
from the home country. We base this assumption on the empirical fact that
one third of world trade is intra-firm trade and this trade is increasingly in
intermediate goods (Andersson and Fredriksson, 2000). In addition, the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2005) reports that the ratio of imports
of goods shipped to US affiliates of foreign multinational firms over affiliate
sales is about 17% in 2002. This survey data shows also that about 80% of
these imports come from the parents.
In the model, firms decide how to enter international markets. Thereby, they
could concentrate their production at home and reach distant consumers
through exports. In this case, firms save the fixed costs associated with the
supplementary production unit abroad. However, they could find it more prof-
itable to set-up affiliates in the foreign country and save the distance costs
associated with exports. Distance raises the costs of exporting and affects
positively the decision to set-up affiliates in foreign countries. Yet, increasing
distance affects negatively the volume of each affiliate’s sales when production
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requires the input intermediate inputs, which must be imported costly from
the home market.
Then, we present a model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous
firms. This model extends Helpman et al. (2004), by relaxing the assump-
tion that the fixed set-up costs are identical in all countries. We assume that
fixed costs increase with distance and motivate this assumption by the fact
that distance raises upfront search costs and organization costs (Chaney, 2006;
Rauch, 1999). As in Helpman et al. (2004) and Melitz (2003), the mode of entry
into foreign markets depends on firm’s productivity. In particular, the equi-
librium is characterized by the coexistence of multinational firms, exporters
and domestic firms. The most productive firms become multinationals, less
productive firms become exporters while the least productive firms serve only
the domestic market. We show that in equilibrium the entry of multinational
firms and thereby aggregated affiliates’ sales decreases with distance. From
both proximity-concentration models, we derive a gravity equation that looks
similar to the structural gravity equation for international trade proposed by
Redding and Venables (2004).
Finally, we derive the gravity equation from a version of a two-country factor-
proportion model of fragmentation based on Venables (1999). Multinational
firms geographically fragment their production process into stages based on
factor intensities. They locate activities according to factor prices and link the
different production units through trade (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Help-
man, 1984; Markusen, 2002; and, Hanson et al. 2003, 2005 for an empirical
assessment). Since trade involves costs that increase in distance, low distance
costs therefore encourage fragmentation and affiliates’ production.
Thus, we present three very different models and derive the gravity equation
from each of them. We do this, because we believe that the success of the
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gravity equation results from the fact that it can be derived from various
models. Nevertheless, we can use gravity equations to discriminate between
different models. In order to discriminate between the gravity equations that
builds on models of horizontal FDI from the one derived from the vertical FDI
model, we need affiliate sales data with variation in factor endowments and
in market size. We use a dataset on bilateral sales of affiliates that has been
taken from Braconier et al. (2003). 1 This dataset has the advantage to cover
information on a large number of countries that varies over time.
We use the econometric methodology proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) that solves the problem of inconsistency of OLS estimates in presence
of heteroscedasticity and takes into account zero-valued observations. We find
much stronger support for gravity equations derived from model of horizontal
multinationals, although we cannot strictly differentiate between horizontal
and vertical multinational activities.
The paper includes six additional sections. We derive the gravity equation
from the symmetric firm proximity-concentration model in Section 2, from a
heterogenous firm proximity-concentration model in Section 3 and, from the
factor-proportion model in Section 4. We present the data and the estima-
tion strategy for an empirical discrimination between the horizontal and the
vertical model in section 5. We show the results in section 6. We conclude in
Section 7.
2 Foreign Production with Domestic Intermediate Inputs
We consider an economy with two sectors: agriculture, which produces a ho-
mogeneous good A and manufacturing which produces a bundle M of differ-
1We are very thankful to Pehr-Johan No¨rback and Dieter Urban for sharing data
and codes with us.
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entiated goods. Consumers purchase A and M and have identical preferences
described by a utility function defined on A and M. Consumers preferences
for single varieties of the M good are described by a sub-utility function de-
fined on the varieties. The utility function of the representative consumer from
country j has the Cobb-Douglas form given in equation (1):
Uj = X
µ
AjX
(1−µ)
Mj (1)
where 0 < µ < 1. XMj is a sub-utility function of CES-type defined in (2)
XMj =
[∫
i
∫
k
x
(σ−1)/σ
kij dkdi
]σ/(σ−1)
(2)
xkij is country j ’s consumption of a single variety produced by firm k from
country i. The elasticity of substitution, σ, is the same for any pair of product
and larger than one. We assume monopolistic competition in manufacturing so
that each variety of the manufacturing good is produced by only one firm. All
varieties are assumed to be symmetric. This simplifies the integral
∫
k x
(σ−1)/σ
kij dk
from equation (2) to the product nix
(σ−1)/σ
ij , where we suppressed the firm
subscript k. The price index in the manufacturing sector, PMj, corresponds
to the CES sub-utility function: PMj =
[∫
i nip
1−σ
ij
]1/(1−σ)
. Given the total
demand (1 − µ)Yj for differentiated products in country j which is derived
from equation (1), the demand for each variety is given by equation (3). Each
firm’s sales in foreign markets depend on its own price, pij, in country j, on
the price index, Pj, in j and on j ’s market size, Yj.
xij = p
−σ
ij (1− µ)YjP σ−1j (3)
Firm can serve foreign market j either by export or by producing abroad.
They choose to produce abroad if it is more profitable than exporting, i.e if
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equation (4) holds
piMNEi − piExi > 0⇔ (1− ρ)[pMNEij xMNEij − pExij xExij ] > fj, (4)
where ρ = σ/(σ − 1) and fj denotes the fixed costs for an additional plant in
country j. Entry of multinational firms is determined by the level of the addi-
tional fixed costs but also by the difference in the sales in the foreign market.
As seen in equation (4), the latter depends on the prices of the exported good
pExij relative to the prices of the good produced abroad p
MNE
ij . Note that the
number of firms from country i that have affiliates in country j is independent
of distance. Either all firms own affiliates in the foreign country or none. The
number of firms is endogenously determined by the zero profit condition.
Following the proximity-concentration literature, we assume that exports incur
distance costs of the iceberg-type. We denote distance costs between country
i and j by τij. Hence, p
Ex
ij = piiτij. We assume that the production of multi-
nationals’ affiliates relies on intermediate goods which are imported from the
home country. The production technology of the variety of firm from country
i in country j is given by the variable cost function Cj =
(
wj

) ( qij
1−
)1−
. This
cost function stems from a Cobb-Douglas production function with cost share
 for labor and 1 −  for intermediate inputs. qij is the price for the interme-
diate good used in the foreign affiliate of a firm from country i in country j.
wj denotes the wage in country j. Like prices of differentiated manufacturing
goods, the price of the intermediate good is subject to distance costs of the
iceberg-type. Hence, qij = qiiτij. Given that the optimal price of a monopolistic
competitive firm is always a fixed markup over the marginal costs, pij = cij/ρ,
and that marginal costs increase in distance costs, prices of goods produced in
foreign affiliates also increase in distance costs. Consequently quantities sold
decrease.
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Nevertheless, profits from producing abroad might be higher than from ex-
porting. The aggregate value of sales of country i ’s firms’ affiliates in country
j is given by equation (5).
nipijxij = nip
1−σ
ii τ
(1−σ)(1−)
ij (1− µ)YjP σ−1j (5)
This equation of bilateral affiliates’ sales can be transformed into a grav-
ity equation for affiliate sales. It contains the home country’s supply charac-
teristics and the demand characteristics of the host country. As in Redding
and Venables (2004), nip
1−σ
ii refers to home country’s supply capacity while
(1− µ)YjP σ−1j refers to the host country j ’s market capacity. We follow their
terminology and denote market capacity by mj and supply capacity by si. We
denote bilateral foreign affiliates’ production nipixij by ASij. We assume that
distance costs τij are an increasing function of geographical distance between
countries i and j, τij = τD
η1
ij with τ being unit distance costs and η1 > 0.
ASij = si
(
τDη1ij
)(1−σ)(1−)
mj (6)
Equation (6) can be written in log-linearized form as
ln(ASij) = α1 + ζ1ln(si)− β1ln(Dij) + ξ1ln(mj) (7)
where α1 = (1− σ)(1− )ln(τ), β1 = (σ − 1)(1− )η1. The structural gravity
equation implies a constraint on the estimates of parameter ζ1 and ξ1. They
must equal one. It is straightforward to test whether this constraints hold in
the empirical analysis. The distance parameter β1 is negative, since σ > 1.
In this symmetric firm model, all firms produce the same amount in the foreign
country j. There is no extensive margin. Either all firms produce in a foreign
market or none. The negative effect of distance costs on affiliate sales ASij
results from the costly import of intermediate goods by the foreign affiliate
from its home country. Thus, the introduction of product-specific intermediate
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goods in the Brainard model introduces an intensive margin of production
abroad. Each firm produces less with increasing distance costs between two
countries. Without specific intermediate goods there would be no effect of
distance on aggregate affiliate sales other than the effect on entry which is
by assumption equal for all firms. Positive affiliate sales in all host countries
would be the same irrespective of their distance from the home country. All
other (closer) countries would have zero affiliate sales.
3 Fixed Costs Increasing in Distance
As in the preceding section we consider two sectors of production, A and M.
We assume consumers’ preferences to be described by the same utility as in
equation (1) and (2).
We depart however from the assumption of symmetric firms which yields an
equilibrium where all firms are active in the foreign country independently
of the distance between the two countries. Yet, it is a well-known empirical
fact that the number of firms falls with distance between two countries. Since
symmetric firm models cannot explain this fact, we incorporate heterogenous
firms in the model in the line of Helpman et al. (2004). We assume therefore
that firms have different level of productivity that they draw from a common
distribution. Differences in productivity translate into different marginal costs,
different prices and different quantities for each firm k. We denote the marginal
costs of a firm k by ak and define the productivity level as 1/ak. Profit max-
imization yields a fixed markup over the marginal costs ak of ρ. Thus, the
price of firm k located in i and selling in country j, pkij = akij/ρ leads to
firm-specific quantities sold in j. Equation (3), which described the optimal
quantity sold in country j by a firm located in country i in our symmetric
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firm model above changes slightly into equation (8) that considers firm-specific
productivity levels.
xkij = p
−σ
kij(1− µ)YjP σ−1j (8)
Although denoted by the same variable, the price index, Pj, in country j differs
from the one in the symmetric model. First, it is affected by the difference
in productivity between firms and thus their different prices and quantities.
Second, it is influenced by the channel that firms choose to serve market j.
In fact, firms from country i can serve consumers in market j through export
or through affiliates’ production. Depending on their productivity level 1/ak,
firms decide through which channel they will supply foreign markets. The
price index of country j changes therefore to Pj =
[∫ (
phkij
)1−σ
dk
]1/(1−σ)
.
The superscript h, h = Ex,MNE, indicates respectively whether a firm is an
exporter or produces abroad.
We normalize the mass of firms from country i to one. Each firm compares
the profits related to each mode of entry in market j. Firms that have a
productivity level higher than 1/aExij are active in country j and earn positive
profits in this market. Firms with a productivity level of 1/aMNEij are indifferent
between exporting and producing abroad because both strategies yield the
same profits. Firms with a higher productivity level than 1/aMNEij produce
in country j, because producing abroad is more profitable. Firms with lower
productivity than 1/aMNEij export to country j. The critical marginal cost
levels (a) for a firm producing only for the home market i (b) for an exporting
firm and (c) for an MNE are derived in equations (9) using the zero-profit
conditions, respectively.
(
aDomi
)1−σ (1− µ)Yj(1− ρ)
P 1−σj ρ1−σ
= fDom (9a)
(
aExij τij
)1−σ (1− µ)Yj(1− ρ)
P 1−σj ρ1−σ
= fEx (9b)
9
(
aMNEij
)1−σ (
1− τ 1−σij
) (1− µ)Yj(1− ρ)
P 1−σj ρ1−σ
= fMNE − fEx (9c)
We assume that fixed costs increase in distance between the two countries i
and j. We assume further that fixed costs of exporting fEx is a fixed share γ
of the fixed costs, fMNE, associated with the production abroad.
Following Helpman et al. (2004), we use the Pareto distribution to parame-
terize the distribution of firms with respect to their productivity. Aggregated
affiliates sales of all firms from country i in the foreign market j, ASij, are
thus given by equation (10).
ASij =
∫ aMNEij
0
(ak/ρ)
1−σg(1/a)
P 1−σj
(1− µ)Yjdk (10)
=
κ
κ− σ + 1
(
aDomij
ρ
)1−σ (aMNEij )κ−σ(
aDomij
)κ−σ+1 (1− µ)YjP 1−σj
Where aDomi is critical marginal cost level for a firm from country that sells
only in the home market. It is the highest marginal cost level observed by
any active firm in country i. The critical marginal cost level aMNEij determines
aggregate affiliate sales, the number of affiliate from country i in country j
and their average size.
The first term describe the supply capacity si =
κ
κ−σ+1
(
aDomij
ρ
)1−σ
of country
i. The term gives the average size of the firms which are active in country
i. Multiplied by the mass of all firms active in country i, which is one, the
term equals the output of the M -sector in country i. The last term combining
market size, (1−µ)Yj, and price level, Pj, of country j is the market capacity of
country j, mj, just as in the symmetric firm model in Section 2. Finally, there
is the middle term in equation (10),
(aMNEij )
κ−σ
(aDomij )
κ−σ+1 , that affects affiliates sales. We
show in the Appendix that this term is a negative function of distance between
the countries i and j. We proxy this term by the flexible function Φij = λD
−η2
ij ,
where λ and η2 are positive parameters and Dij is the geographical distance
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between the countries i and j. Aggregate affiliate sales of firms from country
i in country j are thus given by:
ASij = si(λDij)
−η2mj (11)
Log-linearizing equation (11) yields the second gravity equation.
ln(ASij) = α2 + ζ2ln(si)− β2ln(Dij) + ξ2ln(mj) (12)
where α2 = −η2ln(λ) and β2 = η2. As in the preceding model, the structural
gravity equation implies a constraint on the estimates of parameter ζ2 and ξ2.
They must equal one. Note that Φij is a negative function of distance because
we have assumed distance dependent fixed costs. Without this assumption,
the effect of distance on Φij would be positive.
4 Factor-Proportion Theory
In this section, we derive a gravity equation from a factor-proportion model
with multinational firms. Parallel to the gravity equation for international
trade, the gravity equation does not arise as ’natural’ from this class of mod-
els as it arises from the proximity-concentration framework in Section 2 and
3. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive an equation that explains aggregated
affiliate sales with home and host country’s GDP and distance, i.e. a grav-
ity equation, from factor-proportion models. That is important to notice,
because it clarifies that the good fit of the gravity equation by itself is no
evidence in favor of the proximity-concentration framework relative to the
factor-proportions framework.
According to factor-proportions theories, multinational firms can geograph-
ically fragment their production processes into stages and locate activities
according to international differences in factor prices. Fragmentation is likely
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to arise when the stages of production exhibit different factor intensities and
when countries have different factor endowments and/or factor-prices (Help-
man 1984, Venables 1999, Hanson et al. 2003, 2005).
We follow Venables (1999) in modeling the emergence of vertical multinational
firms. We assume two countries and two perfectly competitive sectors, A and
MZ, each producing a homogenous goods. Good A is freely traded between
the two countries. This good is used as numeraire. Consumers are assumed to
have identical and homothetic preferences. We assume that the technology of
sector A can be characterized by the following unit cost function.
c(wi, vi) = c(wj, vj) = 1 (13)
where the subscript i and j indicate the home and foreign country, respectively.
w denotes the wage, the factor price of low-skilled labor L, v the salary, the
factor price of high-skilled labor S. We assume that the unit-cost function in
equation (13) is an increasing function of wage w and salary v.
Production of goodM requires the use of an intermediate good Z. Both goods,
M and Z, uses the two factors, low-skilled and high-skilled labor, in fixed
proportion. Sector MZ can be either integrated, when both good M and Z
are produced within the same country, or geographically fragmented, when
M and Z are produced in different countries. Fragmented production benefits
from each country’s comparative advantage. The unit cost functions are given
by
bZi = ιwi + (1− ι)vi ; bZj = ιwj + (1− ι)vj (14a)
bMi = ϕwi + (1− ϕ)vi + δpZi ; bMj = ϕwj + (1− ϕ)vj + δpZj (14b)
The coefficients ι and ϕ are fixed factor inputs per unit output. δ denotes
the input of the intermediate good Z, in the production of the final good
M . The prices pZl with l = i, j are the minimum costs of supply of the
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intermediated good Z in the two countries. Thus, pZi ≡ min[bZi , τZij bZj ] and
pZj ≡ min[bZj , τZij bZi ], where τZij is the ad valorem distance cost.
If distance costs τZij are high, production of MZ is integrated. Each coun-
try specializes in the production of the good, A or MZ, in which it has a
comparative advantage. We assume that the countries have fixed endowments
of both factors and that the home country i is the country relatively richly
endowed with high-skilled labor. Firms in i produce the high-skilled-labor-
intensive good, while firms in the foreign country j produce the low-skilled-
labor-intensive good. However, the technologies described above exhibit factor
intensity reversals, so that it is not obvious whether the production of good
A or MZ uses high-skilled labor more intensively. We assume that the home
endowment ratio (S/L)i is more capital intensive than combined MZ produc-
tion, but less than A production. As consequence, firms in the home country
i produce both good A and good MZ. The foreign country j fully specializes
in the production of good A. Firms in country i produce good A more high-
skilled labor intensive than firms in country j, because the relative price of
low-skilled labor is higher in country i than in country j.
Fragmentation is profitable, in contrast, if the costs of shipping the interme-
diate good Z are low. We assume that the production of Z is low-skilled labor
intensive relative to the production ofM, ι < ϕ. Firms from country i in sector
MZ, have then an incentive to relocate the production of the low-skilled labor
intensive stage Z to the foreign country j and specialize on the high-skilled
labor intensive stage, i.e. the production of M, in the home country i. Spe-
cialization along the relative factor endowments is cost-efficient and therefore
profit maximizing in this perfectly competitive setting. If distance costs are
low enough, production of MZ is completely fragmented in a M stage carried
out in the home country i and a Z stage produced in the host country j. Good
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A is produced in both countries, although with different factor intensities in i
and j.
Between these two full specialization equilibria, there exists a range of distance
costs where integrated and fragmented production coexist. Starting from a sit-
uation of integrated MZ production at home, falling distance costs increases
the profitability to produce the Z stage abroad. The fragmentation of pro-
duction increases low-skilled labor demand in the low-skilled labor-abundant
country j and reduces it in i. This raises the costs of production in j and
reduces the costs of production in i until at the given distance costs, the in-
centives to fragment production is eliminated. In equilibrium, the prevailing
production structure includes both integrated and fragmented firms.
Let θ be the share of Z production taking place in the host country j. θ is de-
termined by the factor-price ratios (w/v)i at home and (w/v)j abroad and the
distance costs τZij . The factor-price ratios and the distance costs must combine
to yield the same price in i for intermediate goods produced at home and in the
foreign country (pZi = b
Z
i = τ
Z
ij b
Z
j ). For the whole range of distance cost levels
where integrated and fragmented production coexist, the share of fragmented
production θ increases with falling distance costs τZij (∂θ/∂τ
Z
ij < 0). The share
of fragmented production θ is also affected by the relative factor endowment
of the two countries, Si/(Si + Sj) and Li/(Li + Lj). Additionally, the factor
price effect depends on the size of the two economies. With production of Z
increasing in lower distance costs, the production of A decreases in the host
country j.
Production of the intermediate good Z in country j results from the frag-
mentation of production in sector MZ. Since, Z is transferred within firms,
production of Z can be seen as foreign affiliate output. The whole output of
Z is then processed in country i and therefore sold as intra-firm transaction
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to country i. Thus, the production of the intermediate good Z matches the
sales of country i firms’ foreign affiliates in country j ASij:
ASij = δ(1− µ)Y θ (15)
Equation (15) gives the level of foreign affiliates’ production. It is entirely
intermediate good’s production. The amount of intermediate’s production de-
pends on the share 1−µ of total income Y spend in both countries on the final
good M and on the fraction δ of intermediates good Z that is necessary to
produce good M. A fraction θ of intermediate good’s production is produced
in the country j.
As argued above, this fraction is a function of distance costs τZij . In addition, θ
is positively affected by the relative factor endowments ratio ( Si
Si+Sj
)/( Li
Li+Lj
)
and negatively by the income ratio Yi/Yj between the two countries. We as-
sume that the effects on θ can be separated in a function of distance costs
f(τZij ), a function of relative factor endowment ratio g1(Si/(Si+Sj))/(Li/(Li+
Lj)) and a function of the income ratio g2(Yi/Yj).
As discussed above, distance costs have a negative effect on affiliates’ produc-
tion through the negative effect on θ, ∂θ/∂τZij < 0. Thus, production of foreign
affiliates decrease in distance costs τZij .
The fraction θ is also affected by the relative size of the countries g2(Yj/Yi).
Whereas a large host country j affects the share θ of affiliate production pos-
itively (∂θ/∂Yj > 0), a large home country affects θ negatively (∂θ/∂Yi < 0).
This is an important difference between this factor-proportion model and the
proximity-concentration models above. The supply effect of the home country
i affects affiliates’ production negatively in the factor-proportion model. As-
suming that functions f , g1 and g2 are separable, equation (15) can be restated
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as:
ASij = δ(1− µ)(Yi + Yj)g2(Yj/Yi)f(τZij )g1
(
Ki/(Ki +Kj)
Li/(Li + Lj)
)
(16)
Linearizing equation (16) and assuming that distance costs τZij are a function of
distance Dij, we derive a gravity equation, which is augmented by the relative
factor endowments ratio and the sum of income of both countries.
ln(ASij)=α3 − ζ3ln(Yi) + ξ3ln(Yj)− β3ln(Dij)
+ νRFEij + ϑln(Yi + Yj) (17)
where RFEij = ln(Ki/(Ki + Kj)) − ln(Li/(Li + Lj)). Although equation
(17) looks similar to equations (7) and (12), the discussion of the income
variables Yi and Yj is difficult. The interpretation of ζ and ξ is different from
the models in Section 2 and 3. Since, affiliates’ production takes place to
reduce the overall costs of the firm, home country’s, supply capacity Yi affects
affiliate production negatively. In contrast, host country’s supply capacity Yj
affects affiliate production positively. Goods market demand is represented by
the sum of both countries’ incomes ln(Yi+Yj). Note that the coefficient of the
demand variable ϑ is one, again.
Finally, the relative factor endowment ratio RFE of the two countries affects
the amount of affiliates’ production, because this ratio determines the mini-
mum price pZi of good Z and thereby the fraction of the intermediate good
produced in the home and in the foreign country.
A miss-specified, ad hoc gravity equation without the relative skill variable
RFE and the sum of income variable ln(Yi + Yj) suffers from an omitted
variables bias. Yet, even if the vertical model is appropriate to describe the
data, such a gravity equation yields the known pattern for the estimated coeffi-
cients. The coefficients of income variables ln(Yi) and ln(Yj) are both positive,
the distance coefficient is negative. The income coefficients reflect supply and
demand capacity in each country. Demand capacity is taken by the income
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variables because the sum of income is a positive function both income vari-
ables 0 < ∂Y/∂Yl < 1 with l = i, j.
Equation (17) gives the gravity equation explaining foreign affiliate sales if
the vertical model describes affiliate production correctly. The equation must
include the sum term, otherwise the estimates of country size would be biased.
While the sum of country size affects foreign affiliate sales positively, the size
of the home country alone has an negative effect on affiliates sales. The size
of the host country affects affiliate sales positively. Distance exerts a negative
effect on foreign affiliate sales. This is always the case and does not dependent
on the assumption that the effects on θ can be separated as nicely as we
assumed above. If the effect on θ can not be separated like this, the gravity
equation is a miss-specification but would nevertheless report a positive effect
of the country sizes and a negative effect of distance, when applied to the data.
There is no restrictions on the coefficients for the country size variable other
that the coefficient for the size of the home country i should be smaller than
one.
5 Data and Estimation Strategy
5.1 Data
To distinguish between the gravity equations that builds on models of hori-
zontal FDI from those derived from the vertical FDI model, we need affiliates
sales data with variation in factor endowments and in market size. We use a
comprehensive dataset on affiliates sales that has been taken from Braconier,
No¨rback and Urban (2003). 2 The dataset covers information on a large num-
2We are very thankful to Pehr-Johan No¨rback and Dieter Urban for sharing data
and codes with us.
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ber of countries. The data we use in this paper is slightly different from the
data used in Braconier et al. (2003) since we do not have access to the Swedish
outward FDI data because of confidentiality. We are however able to reproduce
qualitatively their results.
We have bilateral affiliate sales data for 56 home countries and 75 host coun-
tries with observations for at least at least one year. The data are for the year
1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998. Overall, the sample is very unbalanced with 600
country pairs and 1356 observations. For instance, there are 111 combinations
of home and host country with 444 observations with all four years of data
and 203 country pairs with only one year of data. The number of observations
is not evenly distributed over time. There are 541 observations in 1998, but
only 145 observations in 1986. The database contains 209 observations (15.4%)
with zero bilateral affiliate sales.
As Braconier et al., we depict in the Edgeworth box diagram of Figure ?? the
home country skilled labor share of the combined home and host skilled labor
abundant, Si
Si+Sj
, on the vertical axis and the home unskilled labor share of the
combined home and host country unskilled labor endowment, Li
Li+Lj
, on the
horizontal axis. The ratio of the two shares is a determinant of affiliate sales
in the vertical FDI model as given in equation (17). We see from Figure ??
that our dataset on affiliates sales offers large variation in factor endowments
and market size.
Regarding the explanatory variables, the real GDP data in constant 1995 US
dollar have been taken from the the World Development Indicators database of
the World Bank. The distance variable comes from Braconier et al. (2003). We
use bilateral distance in kilometers between two capitals. In a robustness check,
we also include a FDI and Trade openness indicators that have been taken
from Carr et al. (2001) and Braconier et al. (2003). We construct an adjacency
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variable that takes the value of one when the home and host countries share
a common border and zero otherwise.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
Several papers have shown that a nonlinear specification of the gravity model
has important advantages over the standard log-linear specification. According
to Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), in the presence of heteroscedasticity in
the error term εij log-linearization can cause the OLS estimator to be biased.
This is because the log-linearization of the affiliates’ sales variable changes
the property of the error term, which become correlated with the explanatory
variables in the presence of heteroscedasticity. In addition, log-linearization is
incompatible with the existence of zeros in affiliates sales data. As emphasized
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Helpman et al. (2007) for gravity
models of bilateral trade, omitting the zero-valued observations leads to a
non-random sample that can result in biased or inconsistent estimates.
We follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate a Poisson model
pseudo-maximum likelihood. This estimation technique is robust to different
patterns of heteroscedasticity and provide a natural way to deal with zeros in
our data. We therefore estimate the empirical equation (18) and (19) where
we use the dependent variable, ASijt in levels.
ASijt = α+ ζln(Yit) + ξln(Yjt) + βln(Dij) + εijt (18)
where subscript t denotes time. Equation (18) gives the standard gravity equa-
tion for foreign affiliate sales as derived from the horizontal models. The hor-
izontal models predict the coefficients ζ and ξ of the home and host country
GDP to be one. Additionally, the distance coefficient β is predicted to be
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negative. As argued above although miss-specified, this equation also explains
much of the variation of affiliate sales of vertical multinational firms.
ASijt=α− ζln(Yit) + ξln(Yjt) + βln(Dij) (19)
+ νRFEijt + ϑln(Yit + Yjt) + εijt
Equation (19) gives the equation for foreign affiliate sales as derived from the
vertical model. The vertical model predicts the coefficients ϑ of the sum of
home and host countries GDP to be one, the coefficient ζ to be negative and
ξ to be positive. Additionally, the distance coefficient β is predicted to be
negative while the coefficient ν of the relative factor endowment RFE should
be positive.
6 Results
We present several specifications of the gravity equation in Table (1). Specifi-
cation (S1) contains the empirical results of the gravity equation derived from
the proximity concentration models. In specification (S2), we add the omitted
variables if one would derived the gravity equation from a factor proportion
model. We present some robustness check in specification (S3) and (S4). No-
tice that all specifications include a full set of time, home and host country
fixed effects. The robust standard errors have been computed as described by
Wooldridge (1999).
– Table (1) about here –
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The results presented in specification (S1) are in line with earlier results from
gravity equations. Home and host country GDP affect foreign real affiliate
sales positively whereas distance between the two countries affects sales neg-
atively. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at one percent.
While the coefficients on home country GDP is not significantly different from
one, the restriction on both coefficients being equal to unity is rejected at the
five percent level of significance (χ2(2) = 6.41, p-value=0.041). 3 The grav-
ity equation derived from the proximity concentration models suggests that
the coefficients on both GDP variables are one. Yet, this restriction is not
supported by the data.
We include the relative factor endowment and the sum of GDP variables in
specification (S2). The introduction of both variables change the results on
the constraint imposed on the home and host GDP coefficients, but does not
influence the coefficient of the distance variable. Both the home and host
coefficients become statistically equal to one (χ2(2) = 2.92, p-value=0.232).
Contrary to the prediction of the factor proportion model, the coefficient of
the home country GDP variable is positive. We do not find any significant
impact of the sum of GDP variable on real affiliates sales. The vertical gravity
model predicts a coefficient of one. We find however a positive and signifi-
cant coefficient of the relative factor endowment variable. Real affiliate sales
increase in the high-skilled labor abundance of the home country, relative to
the host country. This is in line with the prediction of our factor proportion
gravity model.
Overall, the empirical results of specification (S2) give more support to hori-
zontal multinational activities even if we cannot strictly discriminate between
3This results is due to the rejection at five percent of unity of the host country GDP
coefficient (χ2(1) = 5.14, p-value=0.023). the coefficient of the Home country GDP
variable is statistically equal to one (χ2(1) = 0.99, p-value=0.321)
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the horizontal and the vertical models. The vertical gravity model is supported
by only one criteria: the positive and significant impact of the RFE coefficient
on real affiliate sales. Moreover, the omission of relative factor endowment and
the joint size of the home and the host country does not severely bias the es-
timation results found in specification (S1).
In specification (S3), we add a number of control variables including the FDI
and trade openness index and an adjency variable that takes the value of
one when countries i and j share a common border. We do not find any
significant impact of the trade and FDI openness indexes on real affiliate sales.
Moreover, these variables do not change significantly the results presented in
specification (S2). However, the adjacency variable is positive and significant
at one percent level. Adding this variable roughly halves the estimated effect
of distance on real affiliate sales. The coefficient of the overall size of the home
and host countries becomes significantly negative. Note that the correlation
between Borderij and ln(Yi + Yj) is positive and insignificant (Corr = 0.019,
p-value=0.528). This results is driven by distant and small countries that have
lower bilateral affiliates sales. 4
We follow Braconier et al. and split our sample into observation where the
home country is relatively skilled-labor abundant (RFE > 0) and into obser-
vations where it is unskilled-labor abundant (RFE < 0) in specifications (S4).
We do not find any significant effect of the relative factor endowment in either
case. We present only the results for the sub-sample with relatively skilled-
labor abundant home countries (RFE > 0), because only this sub-sample can
be explained within the theoretical framework of vertical multinational firms.
This specification is most favorable for the vertical model. The joint size of
4We find 44 country pairs with 112 observations that share a common border.
Among these are countries with the largest bilateral affiliate sales in the sample
(Canada-USA, Germany-Netherland, Germany-France).
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the home and host countries does not play any role in specification (S4). The
prediction of the horizontal gravity model are supported when Home is rela-
tively skilled-labor abundant. The estimated coefficients are significant and of
the expected signs. Moreover, the home and host estimated GDP coefficients
become jointly statistically equal to one (χ2(2) = 0.75, p-value=0.688).
7 Conclusion
We derive gravity equations explaining bilateral sales of foreign affiliates of
multinational firms from three very different models of the multinational firm.
Foreign affiliates’ sales are positively affected by domestic supply capacity and
foreign market capacity and negatively by distance between the two countries.
We propose three different models to argue that the success the gravity equa-
tion has in empirical studies results from the fact that it can be derived from
various models.
First, we model a production process of an foreign affiliate that depends on do-
mestic intermediate inputs that are costly to trade. We show that for this case
lower aggregate foreign multinational sales results from lower average foreign
affiliates’ production while the number of affiliates remains unchanged by dis-
tance costs. Second, we model fixed costs of production in the foreign country
which increase with distance between countries in a heterogenous firms frame-
work. In this setting, lower aggregate affiliate sales in more distant countries
results from fewer active affiliates. Both models are proximity-concentration
models that explain the emergence of horizontal multinational firms.
The third model of multinational firms, from which we derive the gravity
equation, is based on the factor-proportion theory. Firms fragment their pro-
duction process in order to benefit from countries’ comparative advantages.
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The derived gravity equation entails a ”relative factor endowment and an joint
size of home and host country biases. Moreover, we show that bilateral affiliate
sales are affected positively by both countries’ income. However, the interpre-
tation of the coefficients of the income variables is very different from their
interpretation in the horizontal model case. Distance between the countries,
in contrast, affects the volume of affiliate sales negatively just as in the gravity
equations derived from proximity-concentration models. Finally, real affiliate
sales increase in the high-skilled labor abundance of the home country, relative
to the host country.
We use a novel econometric methodology and data on bilateral real affiliate
sales to show which type of horizontal or vertical models is supported by
the data. This methodology takes into account zero-valued observation and
inconsistency problems of OLS estimates in presence of heteroscedasticity. Our
findings give support to the horizontal models. In particular, we find that the
omission of relative factor endowment and the overall size of the home and
host countries does not severely bias the estimation results from horizontal
gravity models.
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Appendices
A Distance and Critical Marginal Costs
The Φ term is a positive function of the minimum marginal cost level aMNEij .
∂Φ
∂aMNEij
= (κ − σ + 1) (a
MNE
ij )
κ−σ
(aDomij )
κ−σ+1 > 0. κ and aDomij do not depend on distance
but aMNEij does.
We use equation (9c) to derive the effect of distance on the critical marginal
cost level. We assume that fixed costs are a linear function of distance in
a similar way as variable distance costs. Hence, (1− φ) fMNEj = fDij and
τij = τD
η1
ij . Substituting this functional forms into equation (9c) gives:
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(
aMNEij
)1−σ (
1− τ 1−σij
) (1− µ)Yj(1− ρ)
P σ−1j ρ1−σ
= fDij
⇔ aMNEij =
(
1−
(
τDη1ij
)1−σ)( 1σ−1)
Ω(
1
σ−1)fD
( 11−σ )
ij
where Ω = (1−µ)Yj(1−ρ)
Pσ−1j ρ1−σ
.
We derive the effect of distance on the minimum marginal costs level aMNEij
as
∂aMNEij
∂Dij
=Ω(
1
σ−1) (fDij)
1
1−σ
(
1−
(
τDη1ij
)1−σ) 1σ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
×
[
η1τ
1−σDη1(1−σ)−1ij
(
1−
(
τDη1ij
)1−σ)−1 − 1
σ − 1D
−1
ij
]
This first is positive if distance is not too small, i.e. Dij > τ
−1/η1 . The second
term is negative if distance costs τij are not too convex, i.e. eta1 is not too
small. The second term is negative if
1
(σ − 1)Dij >
η1D
η1(1−σ)−1
ij
τσ−1 −Dη1(1−σ)ij
⇔ τ
σ−1 −Dη1(1−σ)ij (1− (σ − 1)η1)
(1− σ)Dij
(
τσ−1 −Dη1(1−σ)ij
) < 0
The denominator is negative if Dij > τ
−1/η1 , while the numerator is positive
if (σ − 1)η1 > 1. Thus, if distance is not too small and distance costs are not
too convex, the effect of distance on the minimum marginal costs is negative.
Affiliate production in countries further away require lower marginal costs of
the firm. That in turn implies a negative effect of distance on the middle term
Φij.
We proxy the term ( κ
κ−σ+1
aMNEij
adomi
)κ−σ+1 which is a negative function of distance
by the very flexible function Φij = λD
−η2
ij .
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Table B.1
Descriptive Statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ASij 1089 9098.306 26184.340 0.000 324133.4
ln(Yi) 1089 27.206 1.439 23.772 29.713
ln(Yj) 1089 26.788 1.397 23.772 29.713
ln(Dij 1089 8.112 1.139 5.159 9.853
ln(RFE) 1089 0.058 0.444 -2.084 2.516
ln(Yi + Yj) 1089 28.158 1.091 25.811 30.222
Adjacencyij 1089 0.103 0.304 0 1
Proti 1089 27.906 12.054 6.800 81.410
Protj 1089 29.627 13.611 6.800 85.080
Invcj 1089 34.005 11.670 12.500 79.430
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